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I. INTRODUCTION
What first started as a niche phenomenon within the
cryptocurrency community has now reached the realms of
multinational conglomerates, policy makers, and central banks.
From JP Morgan’s Jamie Dimon to Facebook’s Mark
Zuckerberg, stablecoins have made their way onto the
agenda of today’s top CEOs. As projects like Libra have
enjoyed broad media coverage they are also increasingly
scrutinized by regulatory authorities, [1] [2] [3]. And as the
term “stablecoin” spread, its meaning started to blur. This is
problematic. An unclear definition may make us susceptible
to deceptive innovation, that is, reintroducing existing services
but in a different appearance. We ought to ask ourselves: are
stablecoins here to stay or are they simply old wine in new
bottles?
This article aims to educate on stablecoins by providing a
historical context on their origin and describing which key
factors have been driving their adoption. Moreover, we review
existing terminologies and taxonomies on stablecoins and
examine their disruptive potential. Based on this, we propose
a novel definition of stablecoins and outline an alternative
taxonomy. We briefly discuss the different use cases of sta-
blecoins, as well as the underlying economic incentives for
creating them. We also touch upon regulatory considerations
and briefly summarize key factors driving future development.
II. MOTIVATION
Money is omnipresent in modern life, but we rarely dare
to question it. As it has existed for more than 5,000 years,
one is prone to misconceive it as a fixed concept, when, in
fact, it has been continuously changing. And as our society
evolves so does the way we interact and transact with money.
With new forms of money on the rise, we are challenged to
question our understanding of money and ask ourselves: how
shall the future of money look like?
Stablecoins have been discussed as a potential candidate for
a new, faster, more accessible and transparent form of money.
With Facebook’s engagement in the Libra stablecoin, there
has been substantial attention to the topic. But the emergence
of new technologies, such as Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT), has subtly diverged our focus away from ”how can
we create value” to ”how can we use this technology”.
In order to prevent falling prey to deceptive innovation,
policymakers, incumbents, challengers and the general public
alike should have the interest to develop a sound understanding
of stablecoins.
III. WIR: A STABLECOIN PRECURSOR
The concept of devising a supplementary currency system
is not a new one. One of the most successful examples is
the Swiss WIR Bank, formerly known as the Swiss Economic
Circle. WIR was founded in 1934 by Werner Zimmermann
and Paul Enz, [4]. WIR is the abbreviation for Wirtschaftsring-
Genossenschaft (meaning “mutual economic support circle”)
but at the same time also means “we” in German, [5]. WIR
was driven out of the ambition to alleviate the negative effects
of the Great Depression, solve the associated middle class
crisis and reform the monetary system on the basis of the
Freigeld (meaning “free money”) theory, [6]. To achieve these
goals WIR initiated its own WIR currency (“CHW”), allowing
participants to exchange goods and services without using
conventional fiat currencies.
Today the WIR network comprises over 62,000 Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), reporting a turnover of
almost 2 billion WIR in 2012. While nowadays the WIR
network is also open to private clients, its focus remains on
SMEs. The main benefits of joining the WIR network are
threefold: first, companies joining on average experience a 5%
increase in business, most likely due to loyalty effects, [4].
Secondly, participants in the WIR network can obtain loans at
a lower interest rate than compared to traditional bank loans.
And thirdly, members of the WIR network experience a greater
sense of solidarity and community, [6].
Companies participating in the WIR system commit to
accepting CHW for their goods and services at a 1:1 rate to the
corresponding CHF amount. In order to join the WIR system,
companies can apply for a zero interest loan of up to 10,000
CHW, [7]. If a company wishes to leave the system, surplus
CHW must be spent within the system. While the WIR system
bears similarities with the idea of a stablecoin, there also is
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a notable difference: buying or selling CHW on a secondary
market is strictly prohibited, [8]. In section V-D we will come
back to identify the presence of a secondary market as one of
the key characteristics of a stablecoin.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STABLECOINS
It is impossible to have a well-rounded discussion on
stablecoins without examining their origins. Although
numerous stablecoin projects exist today, there is one
stablecoin that stands out in its significance, i.e., Tether,
[9]. As one of the first and to this day most widely used
stablecoins, Tether has played a significant albeit controversial
role for the development of stablecoins.
As of December 2019, there are more than 4.1 billion
Tether tokens in circulation. Each Token is supposed to be
worth $1. The issuing company, Tether Limited, claims that
Tether tokens are 100% backed by liquid Reserves. However,
numerous parties raised allegations that there is a shortfall in
its reserves. These allegations have been fuelled by severe
deficiencies in the auditing process, [10] [11]. Doubts about
Tether’s reserves have repeatedly manifested themselves in
lower secondary market prices. For example, at the beginning
of 2017 Tether’s secondary market price dropped to as low
as $0.91 (see figure 1). Nonetheless, Tether is still by far the
most actively traded stablecoin. In fact, in terms of trading
volume, it can easily compete with other cryptoassets such as
Bitcoin or Ether. [12]
Fig. 1. Tether Prices and Market Cap.
Tether, known initially as Realcoin, was founded in 2014
by Brock Pierce, Craig Sellars and Reeve Collins. Before
founding Tether, two of the three co-founders worked on
a project called Mastercoin (later rebranded as Omni).
Mastercoin’s mission was to allow users to create their own
virtual currencies on top of the Bitcoin protocol, [13] [14],
[15]. For this purpose, the Mastercoin Foundation developed
an additional layer on top of Bitcoin, which would later serve
as the technological foundation for issuing the first Tether
tokens in October 2014.
One of the key drivers for Tether’s growth was its listing on
and distribution through cryptocurrency exchanges. Bitfinex,
as one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges, played a
pivotal role in promoting Tether. Although denied by both
companies’ officials, multiple indications suggest Bitfinex
and Tether have been closely affiliated.1
When Tether tokens first started trading on Bitfinex in
2015, their turnover was rather insignificant. However, as
cryptocurrencies gained traction, so did the Tether stablecoin.
By mid-2017 Tether’s market capitalization had surpassed
$100mn (see figure 1). At the same time Bitfinex users were
starting to experience substantial delays in their U.S. Dollar
withdrawal requests, [?] Shortly thereafter rumors spread that
Bitfinex had been cut off from its U.S. Dollar wire transfers.2
At the same time numerous cryptocurrency exchanges, such
as Kraken, Binance and Huobi, decided to list Tether trading
pairs, [19] [20] [21]. This support allowed Tether tokens to
spread across the cryptocurrency trading ecosystem quickly.
Tether allowed to circumvent traditional wire transfers by
providing an alternative settlement mechanism. Although,
token users were unable to withdraw their U.S. Dollars,
Tether allowed them to transfer their U.S. Dollar-pegged
tokens between exchanges, without being exposed to the
price volatility of cryptocurrencies.
After the 2018 cryptocurrency crash, a paper was published
claiming that Tether was used to inflate and manipulate
Bitcoin prices, [22]. It has been suggested that cryptocurrency
exchanges may have had a vested interest to continue
the distribution of Tether and in general promote the use of
stablecoins to increase trading volumes. Moreover, stablecoins
posed an opportunity for cryptocurrency exchanges to become
less dependent on unstable banking relationships, [23].
Given the strong demand for a stablecoin like Tether, it
comes as no surprise that new players rushed into the market
from late 2017 onwards. For example, in 2018, TrustToken,
Paxos, Gemini, and Circle all launched a U.S. Dollar pegged
stablecoin. These projects promoted their stablecoins as being
more reliable and trustworthy, providing higher transparency
in terms of their reserve management, [24] [25] [26]. Note
that all of these stablecoins were primarily designed to strive
within the cryptocurrency space. The surge in projects also
sparked creativity in terms of how to design a stabilization
mechanism for a stablecoin. For example, a project called
Maker DAO built a decentralized stablecoin (DAI) whose
reserve would be comprised of other cryptocurrencies and
completely governed on-chain through Ethereum smart
contracts. Another project called Basis raised $133 million
1For example, the Paradise Papers leak revealed that Bitfinex officials were
responsible for setting up Tether Holdings Limited in the British Virgin Islands
in 2014. Moreover, Tether Limited and Bitfinex both share the same CEO,
CFO and general counsel, [16] [17].
2As it later turned out Bitfinex’s bank accounts had been frozen by Wells
Fargo, [18].
with the goal of launching an algorithmic cryptocurrency
protocol that claimed to create a stable digital currency
without requiring any asset backing whatsoever. However,
it is noteworthy that the Basis team decided to shut down
the project because it would have been applicable to U.S.
securities regulation, [27].
In parallel to the stablecoin developments from the cryp-
tocurrency community, large cooperations started to exper-
iment with blockchain technology – mainly for large scale
transactions. For example, UBS published a paper introducing
the so-called Utility Settlement Coin in 2016, which financial
institutions can use for facilitating cross-border payments and
settlement, [28]. In 2018, the MIT developed the idea of
Tradecoin, in which multiple “sponsors” form a consortium
where they can tokenize their assets and build a system of
digital cash on top of that. The sponsors contribute assets
to a collectively owned asset pool and receive Tradecoins
in exchange from the consortium. The safekeeping of the
consortium’s asset pool is managed by a narrow bank to
guarantee the full-backing of the Tradecoins with the actual
asset base. The consortium can then use their Tradecoins as
an asset base to issue e-cash tokens to retail users, [29],
[30], [31]. At the beginning of 2019 JP Morgan announced
that it would become the first U.S. bank to create a digital
coin representing a fiat currency. While these projects are not
necessarily comparable to a stablecoin like Tether, they do
appear to have been fuelled by the associated rising interest
for novel digital currency forms.
In June 2019, Facebook officially revealed its plans to
launch a new global digital currency called Libra, [32]. The
Libra project immediately triggered strong headwinds from
regulators. For example, France’s finance minister Bruno Le
Maire said that “no private entity can claim monetary power,
which is inherent to the sovereignty of nations.” [33]. Pub-
lications from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank
for International Settlement (BIS) followed shortly in August
and October 2019, discussing potential risks associated with
stablecoins.
V. TERMINOLOGY
In this section, we first briefly discuss the etymology of
stablecoins and then review the strengths and weaknesses of
standard stablecoin definitions. We then point out some of the
difficulties surrounding stablecoin terminology. We continue
by briefly reviewing Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive Inno-
vation in the context of stablecoins and finally provide a new
definition of stablecoins.
A. Etymology - From Bitcoin to Stablecoin
Before 2008 the term ”coin” was unambiguously associated
with actual physical coins. The advent of Bitcoin, however,
lead to a recontextualisation of the word. One can only
wonder why Bitcoin was not named Bitcash or Bitmoney at
the time.34 But as Bitcoin emerged, the word coin experienced
a semantic change. Its usage was now broadened to the digital
economy.
As the number of cryptocurrency projects increased, so did
the excitement for the digital coin jargon. From Litecoin to
Dogecoin, digital coin minting proved very popular. With a
plethora of inherently volatile digital coins the blockchain
community started exploring whether blockchain could also
be used to create more stable cryptocurrencies, or, in other
words stable coins.
Data from Google Trends shows that the term stablecoin
first emerged in late 2013. Its appearance coincided with a
spike in searches for Mastercoin (see figure 2). As described
in section IV, Mastercoin laid the groundwork for Tether and
made the until then vague concept of a stablecoin a reality.
Thus, Mastercoin and stablecoins are closely intertwined, both
from a conceptual but also from an etymological viewpoint.
Fig. 2. Google searches going from ”Mastercoin” to ”Stablecoin”.
B. Introduction to Stablecoin Terminology
While many different definitions of stablecoins exist, we
highlight the one given by the ECB:
“[Stablecoins are defined as] digital units of value
that are not a form of any specific currency (or basket
thereof) but rely on a set of stabilisation tools which
are supposed to minimize fluctuations of their price
in such currency(ies)”, [34].
Although a rather broad definition, it reflects three important
aspects:
1) First, it is technology-neutral, and it excludes already
existing distinct forms of currencies that simply use DLT
for recording purposes. This fact helps to differentiate
3Perhaps archaic words were more aligned with the ideological tendencies
of declinism and crypto-anarchism within the cryptocurrency community.
4Note that both Bitcash and Bitmoney exist today but were launched long
after Bitcoin in early 2019 and late 2018.
between stablecoins as a genuinely new form of money
(e.g., DAI) and commercial bank money that is powered
by new technology (e.g., JPM Coin).
2) Second, it highlights that there must be some form of
stabilization mechanism to reduce volatility relative to
an existing currency.
3) And third, it points out that stablecoins have a market
price of their own, implying that its price expressed in
the target quote currency is not necessarily equal to one.
Other definitions are often phrased in a way that blurs
the lines between the stablecoin and the “linked” asset. For
example, the BIS states that “stablecoins have many of the
features of cryptoassets but seek to stabilize the price of
the “coin” by linking its value to that of a pool of assets.”
The word “link” suggests a form of equivalence between the
stablecoin and the “linked” asset, when in fact both need to be
conceived as separate assets and can potentially be decoupled.
In this respect, a stablecoins is to its “linked” asset as a
derivative is to its underlying. In particular, most stablecoins
introduce some counterparty risk.
C. Motivation - Why new Terminology?
As already pointed out, there is a blurring line between
stablecoins that are a genuinely new type of asset and those
that represent existing forms of currency. We advocate to avoid
introducing new terminology for already well-understood and
existing concepts (e.g. commercial bank money). Instead,
we endorse to use the term stablecoin to label and identify
genuinely innovative forms of money that lay outside of the
established monetary system (potentially beyond the control
of central banks) but have the potential to fundamentally
change and disrupt it.5
Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive Innovation provides a
useful tool to help identify potentially disruptive stablecoins
and distinguish them from rebranded traditional financial
services. According to Christensen’s theory there are two
forms of innovation: sustaining innovation and disruptive
innovation. [36]
• Sustaining innovation is aimed at improving existing
products for an incumbent’s established customer base.
Typically, higher-quality products are introduced to sat-
isfy the high-end of the market, where profitability is
highest.
• Disruptive innovation, on the other hand, is initially
considered inferior by most of an incumbent’s customers.
It either starts in (1) low-end or (2) new-market footholds.
(1) In the first case, a disruptor introduces a good-enough
product for otherwise underserved low-end customers. (2)
In the second case, a disruptor introduces a genuinely new
product in a market where none existed, basically turning
5For a more detailed comparison between the various already existing forms
of money and genuine cryptocurrencies, we refer the reader to the monetary
control structure cube proposed by [35].
non-consumers into consumers. As shown in figure 3, the
disruptor then moves upmarket, providing the quality that
mainstream customers require, while preserving the ad-
vantages that drove his early success. When mainstream
customers start adopting the new product, disruption has
occurred.
Fig. 3. Disruptive vs. sustaining innovation trajectories, [36].
Putting Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive Innovation into
practice, let us consider three examples: Tether, JP Morgan
Coin, TradeCoin, and Libra.
1) Tether exhibits characteristics of a disruptive innovation.
The reasons are as follows: first, it originated in a low-
end market that was otherwise neglected by incumbents
(see section IV). Tether provided a good-enough product
to help cryptocurrency users transact in something that is
close-enough to the U.S. Dollar, without requiring access
to traditional payment systems or banking services.
Secondly, Tether started moving upmarket. Being listed
on over 100 exchanges, including conservative ones
such as Coinbase, both mainstream as well as high-end
institutional customers (e.g., proprietary trading firms)
have started using Tether. Besides, Tether is scaling
up to support for additional blockchain networks (e.g.,
Ethereum, Liquid, Tron) and currencies (e.g., EUR,
CNY).
2) JPM Coin displays the qualities of a sustaining inno-
vation. There are two reasons to support this view:
first, the coin is aimed at making inter-bank clearing
and settlement better. Such services have been available
before JPM Coin, but the coin was introduced to make
the process faster and more efficient. Secondly, the target
customer base is clearly in the high end of the market
(as JPM Coin is exclusively available to institutional
clients) and not geared towards mainstream or low-end
customers. Therefore, JPM Coin follows an incumbent’s
sustaining innovation trajectory (see figure 3).
3) TradeCoin represents a disruptive innovation. Its main
objective is to give asset-backed currencies a new lease
of life. In its mature state, the DTC can serve as a much-
needed counterpoint to fiat reserve currencies of today.
4) Libra’s innovation quality depends on its go-to-market
strategy. It may be considered a disruptive innovation
if (1) it indeed initially focusses on the low-end market
and (2) subsequently moves up-market. According to its
website, Libra’s vision is to provide payment services
for the 1.7 billion unbanked. The unbanked population
is a low-end market that traditionally has been neglected
by incumbents. With each of Libra’s founding members
having a global reach and substantial financial resources,
they are best equipped to turn their vision into a reality.
If Libra delivers on its promise and someday dominates
the unbanked market, it has a strong potential to move
upmarket and eventually disrupt traditional payment
services.
While missing out on a potential sustaining innovation may
only have minor repercussions, failing to detect a disruptive in-
novation poses an existential threat to an incumbent’s business.
With the rise of DLT, the financial services space has been
overcrowded with seemingly innovative payment solutions. At
the same time, it has become increasingly difficult to separate
genuinely new payment solutions from re-engineered legacy
systems under the guise of innovation. We, therefore, advocate
to use the term stablecoin more carefully to label genuinely
new forms of money that possess disruptive potential. At the
same time, we suggest avoiding the term stablecoin to relabel
existing products or minorly improved ones.
D. A Novel Definition
We aim to provide a compact definition for stablecoins
that captures their essential characteristics and is easy to use.
We identify three fundamental properties that characterize a
stablecoin and sets it apart from other forms of money.
A stablecoin is a digital unit of value with the following
three properties:
1) It is not a form of currency,
2) it can be used without any direct interaction with the
issuer,
3) it is tradable on a secondary market and has a low price
volatility in terms of a target quote currency.
The advantages of using this definition are as follows: first,
it is technology-neutral, focusing on the underlying conceptual
elements of a stablecoin instead of its implementation details.
Secondly, it is mutually exclusive to existing forms of currency
(similar to the ECB definition). This property makes the
definition useful in identifying genuinely new forms of money
with disruptive potential. Thirdly, it highlights the unique
features that make stablecoins distinct from previously known
payment systems. Stablecoins can be used without requiring
any direct interaction with the issuer (e.g., for peer-to-peer
transfers) and they can be exchanged on a secondary market
at a somewhat reliable and “stable” price.6
6In fact, some stablecoins require an efficient secondary market for their
stabilization mechanism to work. Such stablecoin systems are constructed in a
way that, by-design, arbitrage opportunities arise as soon as the market price
deviates from the target par value.
VI. TAXONOMY
A. Review
Most taxonomies classify stablecoins based on differences
in their collateralization-mechanics. For example, some au-
thors suggest to differentiate between fiat-, commodity-,
crypto- and un-collateralized stablecoins, [37]. Others suggest
to group by on-chain-, off-chain- and un-collateralized stable-
coins, [38]. Again others distinguish between fully fiat collat-
eralized, partially fiat collateralized, crypto overcollateralized,
dynamically stabilized and asset collateralized stablecoins,
[39]. Since taxonomies focused on collateralization-types are
already well known, we will refrain from repeating them.
Instead of focusing on collateralization setups, we point to
a simple yet revealing dichotomy of stablecoins: i.e., does
the stablecoin represent a legal claim and therefore require a
functioning legal system or does it work, even in the absence
of any institutions. The former are issued as an IOU and
the issuers may be held responsible if they fail to deliver on
their promise. The later are self-sustained in the sense that the
stabilization mechanism does not rely on any institutions nor
a functioning legal system. Frequently examined features such
as the degree of decentralization and openness of a stablecoin
system are highly correlated with the existence or absence
of a coin holders’ legal claim. For example, if there is no
legal claim associated with a coin, the system is most likely to
be decentralized, with low accountability and high openness.
As a stablecoin system strives through its network effects, it
is unlikely to be restricted for its own sake, but because of
regulatory and legal constraints. If, on the other hand the legal
and regulatory structure allows the system to be open, it most
likely will be.
B. A Tripartite Classification
The fair value of a stablecoin should be equal to its
expected redeemable amount. The trust in the redeemability
of a stablecoin may be based on different rationales. As an
expansion of existing taxonomies, we provide an additional
classification to reflect these differing redeemability rationales,
grouping stablecoins into three categories:
1) Claim based: these coins can come in two forms: first,
coin holders can have a direct legally enforceable right
to personally redeem their coins against a pre-defined
amount or value of a reference asset (e.g., fiat money
or commodity). For example, Circle states in its terms
for USDC that “sending USDC to another address auto-
matically transfers and assigns to that Holder, and any
subsequent Holder, the right to redeem USDC for U.S.
Dollar funds”, [40]. Moreover, coins that are structured
as electronic money or commercial bank money in
prepaid payment systems would also fall under this
category. Secondly, coin holders may benefit from a
transitive claim, i.e., they may not be entitled to redeem
the coin themselves but instead have to go through a
third party. For example, two-tiered stablecoin systems,
such as proposed by Libra where some privileged users
(”authorized resellers”) have a right to redeem while
other users do not, are based on the idea of a transitive
claim.
2) Good-Faith based: these are coins where the holder
believes in the good business practices of the issuer,
assuming redeemability of his coins without having any
legal right. The issuer typically promotes the coins to be
backed by reserves but excludes any right of redemption
in its terms and conditions. For example, TrustToken
states in its legal terms that ”the Company itself does
not guarantee any right of redemption or exchange of
TrueCurrency tokens for fiat currency, ” [41].7
3) Technology based: these are coins where technology is
used to autonomously induce price stabilization, e.g.,
using smart contracts to store and manage cryptoasset
collateral. These systems do not rely on a legal claim or
a user’s faith in the good intentions of the issuing entity.
Instead, the user’s expectations of the redeemability is
driven by their trust in the underlying technology and
implementation. For example, on-chain collateralized
and algorithmic stablecoins belong to this category.
To put our view into a broader context, we refer to the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) money tree (see figure
4). The money tree identifies five different means of payment,
i.e. B-money, E-money, I-money, Central bank money and
cryptocurrencies. According to our definition (see section V-D)
and taxonomy, claim and good-faith based stablecoins would
comprise I-money and partly E-money. Technology based
stablecoins are congruent to the IMF’s definition of ”managed
coins”, [42]. We can see that our framework is at least partially
congruent with the IMF’s categorization – in particular with
respect to differentiation based on the existence or absence of
a claim.
Fig. 4. Placing stablecoins into the IMF’s “money tree”, [42].
VII. USE CASES
Of the many use cases that have been discussed for stable-
coins, the following have materialized so far:
7Similarly, stablecoins that promote buybacks to stabilize market prices
would fall under this category as well as such buybacks would typically occur
at the issuer’s discretion without being legally bound to it.
• Cross-border payments & arbitrage: stablecoins have
been used for cross-border payments, especially between
cryptocurrency exchanges, giving traders a tool to take
advantage of arbitrage opportunities and thereby improv-
ing market efficiency.
• Trading & settlement: stablecoins have been used as
a trading instrument to quickly convert from volatile
cryptocurrencies into more stable currency substitutes
and vice versa. Conversely, from the perspective of the
cryptocurrency exchanges, they allowed them to offer
their users U.S. Dollar-like trading and settlement func-
tionalities without depending on traditional wire trans-
fers. Thereby stablecoins enabled exchanges to become
less reliant on often fragile banking partnerships. It is
noteworthy that most stablecoin wallets are controlled by
cryptocurrency exchanges, suggesting that users mainly
transfer stablecoins between exchange omnibus wallets
and rarely withdraw. For example, a recent report found
that only about 300 entities control over 80% of Tether
tokens, with many of these being cryptocurrency ex-
changes, [43].
• Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications: offer a broad
variety of use cases including decentralized exchanges,
lending markets, derivatives and on-chain asset man-
agement, [44]. For all of these applications, stablecoins
play an important role. Additionally, stablecoins like
DAI allow users to take on leveraged trading positions.8
Moreover, users can also lock up their DAI tokens to earn
interest (e.g., Aave, Compound, dYdX).
Other use cases like payment, payroll, and remittance have
not found much attention so far. Similarly, integration of
stablecoins into Decentralized Applications (DApps) or as a
cash leg handling in smart contract-based financial contracts
is yet to find wider adoption.
VIII. REVENUE STREAMS & COST STRUCTURE
Stablecoin issuers may profit from multiple revenue streams.
The composition of revenues may vary greatly depending on
the exact stablecoin setup. For example, technology and claim-
based stablecoins are likely to exhibit very different revenue
stream structures. Regardless of the different stablecoin types
and their differing revenue focus, we identify the following
five revenue streams:
• Interest earnings: stablecoin issuers typically allocate
all interest earnings generated from the reserve fund
to themselves. Issuers are not required and, in some
instances, even prohibited to pass on interest earnings to
coin holders. For example, Electronic Money Institutions
(EMIs), such as Circle, are prohibited to grant interest.
8For example, DAI currently uses an over-collateralization rate of 150%,
meaning that for $100 worth of DAI $150 worth of cryptoassets need to be
locked in a so-called Collateral Debt Position (CDP) (or vault). [45] A trader
wanting to leverage his ETH position could lock $100 worth of ETH and
receive $100/150 = $66.6 worth of DAI. He could then buy $66.6 worth of
ETH, lock these assets in the CDP and repeat this process again and again,
yielding a total leveraged position of $300.
Depending on the legal structure of the stablecoin, issuers
may have varying degrees of freedom in terms of the
reserve fund management. Generally, issuers have an
incentive to issue stablecoins for currencies that offer
positive interest rates. For example, TrustToken supports
stablecoins for USD, GBP, AUD, CAD, and HKD, all
of which used to provide positive interest rates, ranging
between 0.75% and 3.95% p.a., [46]. However, most of
these rates have been cut to almost zero lately. Depending
on the size of the reserve funds, interest earnings may be
substantial. For example, let us assume Tether has $4.1
billion in reserves. ”The composition of the Reserves used
to back Tether Tokens is within the sole control and at
the sole and absolute discretion of Tether”, [47]. Let us
further assume Tether’s liquidity management allocates
80% of the reserves into U.S. Dollar money market funds
with an annual percentage rate of 1.7%. The float would
generate earnings of $55.8 million per year, [48].
• Transaction fees: stablecoin issuers may charge fees
for every transfer. For example, Tether’s smart contract
has a feature that allows to charge up to 20bps of
the transaction value with a maximum fee of $50 per
transaction, [49]. Let us assume the daily average number
of transactions to be 100,000, with an average size of
$5,000, [50]. If Tether were to charge a 1bps transaction
fee, this would result in revenues of $18.2 million per
year. However, Tether has not charged any transaction
fees so far, because doing so would disincentivize using
Tether coins, potentially leading to a shrinking reserve
fund and diminishing interest earnings. Moreover, the
transaction fee would only apply to on-chain transactions
(excluding any intra-exchange transaction). So far, inter-
est earnings seem to have outweighed potential earnings
from transaction fees. As commented in their code, Tether
most likely sees transaction fees as a means of last resort
(”[. . . ] if transaction fees ever became necessary”, [51]).
• Issuance & redemption fees: stablecoin issuers may
charge fees for the issuance (minting) and redemption
(burning) of stablecoins. For example, Tether charges
0.1% per deposit and the greater of 0.1% and $1,000
per withdrawal, [52]. Obviously the issuer may use fees
to steer the in- and out-flows to its stablecoin. This may
become necessary if the issuer has limitations in terms of
the reserve fund size or balance sheet (e.g. considering
capital requirements for EMIs or restrictions given by an
issuer’s banking partner). Similarly, in case of liquidity
shortages an issuer may discourage outflows by imposing
higher withdrawal fees.
• Cross-selling: stablecoin issuers may cross-sell additional
services that build upon their stablecoin. For example,
some cryptocurrency exchanges are closely affiliated with
stablecoin issuers (e.g., Bitfinex and Tether as described
in section IV). Stablecoins may serve as a mean to
attract and facilitate trading on their platforms. Moreover,
exchanges may also market-make their own stablecoins,
providing additional revenue potential.
• Secondary tokens: technology-based stablecoins systems
are often designed as a two-fold token model, where one
token serves as the stablecoin, and the second provides
some special functionality to interact with the stablecoin
system. The second token is typically designed to in-
crease in value with stablecoin usage. The initiators of
the stablecoin system regularly allocate a proportion of
these tokens to themselves to benefit from such value
appreciation. For example, DAI has a special governance
token (MKR) which is also needed to close CDPs (see
section VII). Whenever a user wants to regain access to
his locked cryptoassets, he needs to pay interest in the
form of MKR tokens, which subsequently get burned.
As the supply of MKR tokens decreases over time, there
will be a lower supply that may c.p. lead to higher prices.
As with the revenue streams, a stablecoin’s cost structure
differs across stablecoin types. In particular, the cost structure
will heavily depend on whether the issuing entity is regulated
or not. In general, we identify the following seven cost
components:
• Legal, regulatory & compliance: various legal and regula-
tory clarifications may become necessary. Depending on
the regulatory status of the issuer, e.g. EMIs, licensing
costs may incur. Licenses may be necessary for every
jurisdiction in which the stablecoin shall be made avail-
able. Moreover, compliance efforts, e.g. to ensure adher-
ence with Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations and
applicable Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) requirements,
need to be considered.
• IT development: in case a public DLT is used, the
stablecoin issuer benefits from the openness and inter-
operability of the underlying DLT. Development costs
would mostly comprise setting up the smart contract.
In contrast, integration into third-party systems such as
wallets or exchanges does not involve additional efforts
(e.g., by adhering to standards such as ERC20).
• IT audits: when a stablecoin is based on a public DLT the
proper functioning of the corresponding smart contract
is of critical importance. Typically, a stablecoin issuer
mandates security experts to audit the smart contracts in
order to assure that the contracts do not have any security
flaws and work as expected.
• Financial audits: depending on the regulatory status of
the stablecoin issuer, audits of its financial statements
may be mandatory. Some issuers may voluntarily conduct
financial audits to assure users that the reserves are
managed responsibly.
• Banking services: depending on the nature of the stable-
coin, the issuer may rely on banking services to store its
reserves.
• Key management: the issuance and redemption of stable-
coins involve some form of approval workflow. Especially
for stablecoins that use a public DLT, secure management
of potential admin/issuer keys is of utmost importance.
• Insurance: in case a stablecoin is backed by physical
assets, such as gold or bank notes, the corresponding
storage would typically require insurance coverage.
Depending on the stablecoin category, the cost structure may
tend to involve higher fix costs than variable costs, providing
an attractive scalable business case. It comes at no surprise that
some stablecoin issuers are incorporated in offshore locations
to evade regulatory requirements while still benefiting from
the global scale that borderless DLT systems provide.
IX. REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
From a regulatory standpoint, no unified definition of
stablecoins exists so far. In order to reflect the current
situation, we briefly review the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) statement on stablecoins,
the U.S. proposed ”Managed Stablecoins are Securities Act
of 2019” and the ECB position.
FINMA points out that no specific regulation currently
covers stablecoins. However, following a technology-neutral
approach, FINMA states that many proposed stablecoin
projects give rise to licensing requirements under the Banking
Act or the Collective Investment Schemes Act (CISA).
Moreover, as stablecoins are regularly intended to serve
as a means of payment, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) is almost always applicable, resulting in strict KYC
requirements, transaction monitoring etc. Lastly, if a payment
system of significant importance is to be created, a licensing
requirement under the Financial Market Infrastructure Act
(FMIA) is probable. FINMA identifies eight categories
of stablecoins with most of them falling under existing
regulations. For example, if a stablecoin is linked to a fiat
currency, this likely constitutes a deposit-taking business
under banking law (e.g., Tether). If a stablecoin is linked to a
basket of fiat currencies, as proposed by Libra, the applicable
regulation depends on who bears the market risk associated
with the management of the currency basket. If the issuer bears
it, this constitutes a deposit-taking business under banking
law. If the token holders bears it, the stablecoin is considered
a collective investment scheme, [53]. The fact that FINMA
subsumes most of the stablecoins under existing regulation
substantiates our view that in many instances stablecoins are
not a new form of currency (see sections V-D, V-C and VI).
Similar to Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority’s
(FINMA’s) substance over form attitude, U.S. policymakers
have advocated a ”same risks, same rules” approach towards
stablecoins. In the newly proposed ”Managed Stablecoins are
Securities Act of 2019”, they define ”managed stablecoins” as
a digital asset whose value is determined by reference to the
value of a basket of assets and where the holder is entitled
to obtain payment based on the value of that basket. These
”managed stablecoins” shall be considered as securities under
the existing Securities Act of 1933, [2].
Lastly, the ECB has formulated a similar stance towards
the regulatory treatment of stablecoins as FINMA and U.S.
policymakers. While the ECB does acknowledge that some
stablecoins may fall outside of current regulatory regimes,
in many cases the risks that they entail are “the same as for
their non-DLT competitors.” In particular, the ECB states that
stablecoins issued as tokenized funds are likely to qualify
as electronic money and as such are already covered by
the existing second Electronic Money Directive (EMD2) in
the EU. The ECB also points out that the use of a new
technology may often be mistaken for the introduction of a
new asset class. However, those stablecoins that are truly part
of the new phenomenon of crypto-assets, may still involve
major uncertainties relating to their governance and regulatory
treatment, [34].
It is noteworthy that the regulatory treatment of stablecoins
is not only relevant for potential licensing requirements but
may also have an impact on its accounting treatment. For
example, concerning the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet,
FINMA has suggested applying an 800% risk weight to
cryptocurrency assets regardless of whether these assets are
held in the bank or trading book, [54]. Depending on its
specific nature, a stablecoin may be seen as a cryptocurrency
and thus induce higher capital requirements. Since no official
statement has been given so far, it seems that every bank
intending to transact in stablecoins is best advised to check
the coin’s regulatory qualification with the regulator. Similarly,
from the perspective of a stablecoin issuer, the accounting
treatment on the liability side of his balance sheet may vary
greatly depending on the exact nature of the stablecoin. While
stablecoins construed as electronic money may be straightfor-
ward to account for, more exotic stablecoin formats may be
rather challenging.
X. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS & OUTLOOK
Factors from within and outside of the stablecoin universe
are going to drive further development of stablecoins.
Incumbents and policymakers, as well as challengers and
users, are going to influence the stablecoin evolution.
Within the cryptocurrency universe, the creation of a new
prominent DApp or cryptoasset may lead to a sudden demand
shock in stablecoins. For example, if stablecoins are required
to interact with such a DApp or represent the only access point
to purchasing a new promising cryptoasset, the demand for sta-
blecoins would likely surge. Similarly, the adoption of decen-
tralized exchanges may as well lead to increasing demand for
stablecoins in order to facilitate trading. In contrast, in case of
a major incident, such as the detection of a critical vulnerabil-
ity in a DLT system or a large-scale security breach with one of
the dominant cryptocurrency exchanges, stablecoins are likely
to backdrop. Depending on the severity of such an incident,
policy makers may see themselves forced to impose stricter
rules on businesses interacting with stablecoins. A policy
shock, e.g., the introduction of specific licensing requirements,
may make stablecoin projects less attractive, and in the worst
case, bring further development to a halt. Aside from the
regulatory circumstances, the overall economic environment
may impact stablecoin adoption. For example, if interest rates
were to normalize, the demand for more risky asset classes
may recede and lead to higher opportunity costs for users
when holding zero-interest bearing stablecoins. On the other
hand, in case of a financial crisis, users may suddenly find
themselves attracted to alternative forms of currency such as
cryptocurrencies. Increased trading activity on cryptocurrency
exchanges could positively affect the popularity of stablecoins.
Lastly, the overall monetary system may be fundamentally
changed through the introduction of a central bank digital
currency (CBDC), potentially upstaging stablecoins.
XI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
Stablecoins are an ambiguous concept of money. While
they first originated in the world of cryptocurrencies, they
have now become an independent concept of their own.
Nonetheless, it is vital to understand how and why they
first came into existence in order to develop a deeper
understanding of what problems they currently solve and may
address in the future.
As described in section IV, stablecoins developed initially
from the idea of democratizing the issuance of private
currencies. At the same time, cryptocurrency exchanges
needed a fiat currency substitute that would allow them to
become less reliant on typically fragile banking partnerships.
Stablecoins proved to be an elegant solution for growing
the cryptocurrency trading ecosystem while minimizing
dependency on traditional banking services. As Tether grew
popular, so did the general enthusiasm for stablecoins. And
as the usage of the term stablecoin spread, its meaning started
to blur.
But an imprecise terminology may make us susceptible
to deceptive innovation, overestimating the significance
of re-engineered legacy payment systems and potentially
overlooking more profound changes in our monetary system.
As described in section V-C, Christensen’s Theory of
Disruptive Innovation provides a useful tool to distinguish
between stablecoins as a genuinely new asset type and old
wine in new bottles. Building upon those insights, we provide
a new definition that distills the essential characteristics
of a stablecoin. Specifically, we claim that: (1) it is not
an existing form of currency, (2) it does not require any
direct relationship with the issuer, and (3) it is tradable on
a secondary market at a relatively stable and predictable price.
In section VI, we propose an easy to use yet expressive
taxonomy that focuses on the absence or existence of a legal
claim, distinguishing between claim-, faith- and technology-
based stablecoins. We also put this classification into a
broader context by comparing it with existing taxonomies
and find a strong congruence with the IMF’s money tree.
In section VII, we briefly review current use cases of
stablecoins, highlighting cross-border payments, cross-
cryptocurrency exchange settlement and DeFi applications.
We claim that the idea of stablecoins has outgrown its
cryptocurrency origins. However, its usage is still very much
rooted in the cryptocurrency space.
In section VIII, we examine the revenue and cost structure
of stablecoins. We find that interest earnings on the reserve
funds provide substantial upside potential for stablecoin
issuers. Given their predominantly fixed-cost structure,
stablecoins constitute highly scalable business models.
Unsurprisingly, to reduce costs, many issuers are incorporated
in offshore locations while still benefitting from the global
reach of today’s DLT platforms.
In section IX, we briefly consider the regulators’
perspectives by reviewing statements given by the FINMA,
U.S. policymakers as well as the ECB. We find that most
regulators have a technology-neutral view, aiming to subsume
stablecoins under existing regulations.
In section X we complete our stablecoin examination by
shortly outlining potential future scenarios. We find that
claim- and faith-based stablecoins build upon existing money
forms, whereas technology-based stablecoins are decoupled
from the traditional money creation circle.
All in all, we conclude that stablecoins are a moving
target with tremendous potential to fundamentally change the
financial system. With DLT providing a borderless and easy to
integrate infrastructure, stablecoins have the potential to scale
rapidly on a global scale and disrupt existing payment systems.
Stablecoins are challenging our notion of money, creating a
paradox situation in which they may be used like a currency
without actually being labelled a currency. It remains yet to be
seen whether stablecoins are going to coexist, complement, or
takeover existing payments. But in any case, we should aim
to use a more concise technology-neutral language, allowing
us to focus on the truly disruptive potential of future money
forms and applying new technologies such as DLT in a more
purpose-driven way.
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